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I. INTRODUCTION
Five year old Jose Patino was riding his bicycle when he was caught in gang
crossfire; a bullet pierced through his back, grazed his bladder, and came out his
stomach before his father could pull him from the streets.'
The City of Chicago ("Chicago") is a metropolis plagued by the high murder
rates, drive-by shootings, drug dealings, and vandalism of criminal street gangs.'
Neighborhoods are battle zones, where people are afraid to step outside their
homes onto streets that were once safe to stroll down at any time of day.3 Each
year serious crimes attributable to criminal street gangs have incessantly increased
in number.4 In 1998, the Department of Justice estimated the existence of 23,000
gangs having 650,000 members, 100,000 or more of which exist in Chicago.5
In an attempt to explore criminal street gang activity, mainly that of loitering
in public and the problems it creates, Chicago's city council conducted several
hearings in 1992.6 During those hearings, people from the neighborhoods most
effected by criminal street gangs testified, expressing their fear and frustration.7
Chicago's city council made a series of findings at the hearings and based on those
findings, the City of Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was enacted.'
After the enactment of Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago
police made thousands of arrests and gang activity seemed to be decreasing; the
1. See Bob Greene, Even Capone Would be Disgusted, CHi. TRiB., Oct. 10, 1999, at 2. "A study of
children in Chicago day care centers found that 100% of them had seen a shooting by the age of five." Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 21, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.
1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121) (citing P. Bennett, Growing Up, Skewed, with Violence, BOSION GLOBE, June
4, 1992, at 1).
2. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (1999); City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660
N.E.2d 34, 36 (111. App. Ct. 1995); City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57 (III. 1997).
3. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 14-15, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121).
4. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1854.
5. See James Kilpatrick, Fine Line Between Liberty and Order, ST. J.-REG. (Ill.), Dec. 22, 1998, at 6.
6. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1854.
7. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (1999).
8. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997).
people were hopeful. 9 However, several arrestees, including Jesus Morales,
challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance, claiming that the Ordinance is
a restraint on personal liberty.'° Even though Morales claims the Ordinance is
unconstitutional because it restrains his personal liberty, an important question
still remains; is it okay to do so to protect the greater community?
The historical background of this issue is discussed in part II." Part III of this
note outlines the facts of City of Chicago v. Morales and its procedural
background.' Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's decision, as well as the
concurring and dissenting opinions, and the reasoning behind those decisions.'3
Part V discusses the impact of the Court's decision and finally, part VI draws
some brief conclusions. 14
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The citizens of the United States are guaranteed due process by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. 5 Thus, citizens have a constitutional right to
partake in certain activities, as well as to be put on notice of which activities are
prohibited.' 6 If these rights are not being upheld by a particular law, that law can
be challenged, and may be found to be unconstitutional. 7 There are two ways in
which such laws can be challenged.' 8
A. The Overbreadth Challenge
If an enacted law encompasses a substantial amount of protected conduct
while proscribing prohibited conduct, that law is "overbroad" and may be
invalidated.' 9 As well as the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights, a
large concern of the overbreadth doctrine is the assurance that laws do not deter
individuals from exercising those guaranteed rights.20 However, even if a law
encompasses protected conduct, the law cannot be invalidated unless the amount
of protected conduct is substantial.2'
9. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855; see also Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get
First Supreme Court Review, USA TODAY, April 21, 1998, at B 10.
10. See generally Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849.
11. See infra notes 15-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 73-206 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 207-296, 297-303 and accompanying text.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 (1999) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)).
17. See generally Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849.
18. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612-15 (1973)).
19. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857; see also Angela L. Clark, City of Chicago v. Morales: Sacrificing
Individual Liberty Interests for Community Safety, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 113,122 (1999).
20. See Clark, supra note 19, at 121 (asserting that if individuals cannot distinguish protected from
prohibited conduct, those individuals may refrain from conduct that is protected, due to fear).
21. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612-15 (1973)).
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B. The Void-for-Vagueness Challenge
If a law cannot be invalidated pursuant to the Overbreadth Doctrine, there is
still another option.22 A law is capable of violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if that law is considered vague on its face.23 The policy
behind the void-for-vagueness doctrine is one of fairness,' and there are two ways
in which vagueness can invalidate a statute; by either failing to provide adequate
notice to citizens of what conduct is prohibited, or allowing or encouraging
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 2
5
1. Adequate Notice
"It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if [the law] is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to the conduct [that law] prohibits. '26 A law must define the offense to which
it pertains with sufficient definiteness, so that a reasonable person can be put on
notice as to what conduct is protected pursuant to the law, and what conduct is
prohibited.27 "[I]t is unjust to punish a person without providing clear notice as
to what conduct was prohibited."28
2. Arbitrary Enforcement
In addition to putting the reasonable person on notice, a law must be drafted
"in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."'29
22. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that a law is
unconstitutionally vague when people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning").
24. Another concern of the Court is that if laws are overly vague, those laws may deter people from
exercising constitutional rights, and thus, have a chilling effect. See Clark, supra note 19, at 121 (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)). But see Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction
of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 1, 20 (1997) (stating that some justices
have suggested that a chilling effect significant enough to justify a facial review would never result from
a void-for-vagueness challenge).
25. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859.
26. Id.
27. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that a statute requiring loiterers to
provide credible and reliable identification is unconstitutional).
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONsTITUnONAL LAW PRINCIPLEs AND PoLCIES 763 (1997).
29. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. A professor at Northern Illinois University School of Law believes
that laws which give law enforcement officials too much discretion are passed because society is
overreacting to street crimes. See Christy Gutowski, Liberty vs. Safety DuPage's LawsuitAgainstAlleged
Gang Pits Personal Freedoms Against Personal Protection, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Dec. 6, 1999, at
It is this requirement that Justice O'Connor finds to be the most important aspect
of any void-for-vagueness challenge, ° asserting that the Court's concern for
minimal guidelines is rooted as far back as 1875."' If law enforcement officials are
allowed too much discretion in the enforcement of laws, they are basically given
a tool to discriminate against whomever they choose.32 Law enforcement officials
achieve such discrimination through randomly exercising their own judgment in
choosing who, out of all citizens encountered, is violating the law. 3 Although
6.
30. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. ("Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines,
a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections."').
31. See id. (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (stating that it would be dangerous
to give the courts unfettered discretion)).
32. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170
(1972)). "[T]he vagueness doctrine allows courts to reach hidden bias or prejudice in law enforcement."
Peter W. Poulos, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness and Overbreadth in
Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 390-91 (stating that bias and prejudice break down the rule of law
and are "inconsistent with evenhanded administration of the law"). "It fumishes a convenient tool for 'harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit
their displeasure."' Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 97-98
(1940)). But see Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages ofAntiquated Procedural Thinking:
A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 201-09 (1998) (stating that the law in
Papachristou is outdated because "institutionalized racism" was something that was fully justified during
the era of Papachristou); David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TiMEs, June
11, 1999, at Al ("These people do not fear police discretion, they fear abuse, assault, and death.").
33. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983). The ACLU asserted that the Ordinance is
"exemplary of what happens when politicians seek to appear tough on crime, ignoring the basic rights of
individual citizens." See Opinion Ruling Need Not Signal End of Anti-Gang Efforts, ATLANTA J., June
14, 1999, at A8.
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there are some who disagree,' 4 many people believe minority groups are the ones
chosen most often.35
One particular area of law prone to this type of arbitrary enforcement is the
area of loitering laws.36
C. Loitering Laws
34. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 11, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121) (stating that political representation of minorities has
increased, as well as support of the Ordinance given by by minorities themselves). "New York, Washington
D.C., and Los Angeles, for example, have all had black police chiefs accountable to black mayors." Id.;
see also Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 207 ("African Americans are no longer excluded from the
nation's democratic political life."). The current relationship between the supporters of the Ordinance and
the arrestees versus that relationship in the 1960s is vastly different. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 11-12, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No.
97-1121) (discussing the fact that African-Americans are the driving force behind some anti-gang
legislation). Those who are supporting the Ordinance are the "mothers and fathers, the sisters and brothers,
and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject to the law." See id. at 2. "They support the Ordinance
because it is a form of policing that secures order without destroying the lives of community youth who find
themselves enmeshed in the complex social and economic forces that fuel gang criminality." Id.; see also
Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 206 (discussing the change in social dynamics concerning African-
Americans). In fact, of the 8,500 signatures collected in support of the Ordinance, over half were collected
in predominantly Latino communities. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood
Organizations at 11-12, City ofChicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121). According to
the Chicago Neighborhood Groups, "any suggestion that the Ordinance was adopted as a cover for
harassing minority youths is completely misguided." See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago
Neighborhood Organizations at 16, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121).
In defense of law enforcement, a man by the name of Justin Waters had this to say:
Funny; I have a job, I don't hang out on the streets, I don't sell drugs, I don't
terrorize people and claim the neighborhood that I happen to live in is my "turf,"
and I've never been unconscious in a car with a firearm. And the couple of times
I've dealt with police, I was cooperative and didn't give them a hard time, because
I know how difficult and stressful their job is. Not once have I ever been shot or
harassed by them. And I am black.
See LA Police CRASH Unit, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at B 10.
35. The ACLU stated that the Court "has recognized that 'it is not a criminal activity simply to be a
young man ofcolor gathered with friends on the streets of Chicago."' See Opinion Ruling Need Not Signal
End ofAnti-Gang Efforts, A'IANrA J., June 14,1999, at A8. Racial profiling of motorists and unexplained
police shootings are two examples of why some believe police discrimination toward minorities is prominent
in today's society. See David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES, June
11, 1999, at Al. Because those typically arrested pursuant to the Ordinance are members of minority
groups, such as African-Americans and Latinos, many believe the Ordinance allows law enforcement
officials to discriminate, by couching arrests in terms of the Ordinance. See Gerard Aziakou, Latinos in
Chicago Suburb Outraged by Anti-Gang Ordinances AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, April 30, 1999, available in
1999 WL 2593738 (stating that seventy-five percent of Cicero residents are Latinos who feel singled out
by the Ordinance).
36. See Clark, supra note 19, at 122-23.
Loitering laws have been used throughout history in an attempt to prevent
crime by removing "'undesirable persons"' from the streets.37 The problem arising
from this type of preventative measure is that individuals may be punished for
engaging in protected conduct,38 and thus, many loitering ordinances have been
found to be unconstitutional." In fact, the only loitering ordinances that seem to
withstand constitutional challenges, are those that combine loitering with some
other criminal act.4°
In what has often been referred to as the "good old days," juveniles hanging
out on street corners never seemed to be an indication that neighbors should be
concerned for their safety. But, as time has gone by, crime has increased and
family values have decreased.4 The juveniles of today have changed dramatically
and they are threatening to society.42 Today, crime in large cities is out of control;
juveniles form criminal street gangs, take control of communities, and commit
heinous crimes.43
D. Criminal Street Gangs in Chicago
A substantial amount of crime in Chicago has been directly linked to criminal
street gangs.44 Chicago's city council and police department, desperate to get a
handle on criminal gang-related crime if not eliminate it altogether, held hearings
in 1992, where they listened to city residents express their fears and frustrations
towards criminal street gangs.45 During the hearings, witnesses from the
neighborhoods with a high volume of criminal gang activity, as well as aldermen
37. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (111. 1997) (citing Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-63 (1972)).
38. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 60-61; see also Clark, supra note 19, at 123.
39. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (finding an ordinance making it a crime for
three or more persons to assemble in a manner that is annoying to other people unconstitutionally vague);
see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding a vagrancy ordinance
attempting to prevent crime by removing "undesirable persons" from the streets unconstitutionally vague);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (finding a California anti-loitering statute unconstitutionally
vague); E.L. v. Florida, 619 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1993) (finding a Florida ordinance intending to reduce drug
relatedactivity unconstitutionally vague); City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993) (finding
that an Ohio ordinance intending to reduce drug related activity violated the fourteenth amendment).
40. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 61 (listing several cases upholding loitering ordinances when the act of
loitering is in combination with acts such as, begging, solicitation, or is done in a manner that would cause
alarm); see also Clark, supra note 19, at 123-24 (discussing the Court's opinion in Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (stating that the loitering ordinance gave law enforcement too much
discretion)).
41. See Howard B. Eisenberg, A ModestProposal: State Licensing of Parents, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 1415,
1417-18 (1994) (stating that a decline in family values is a major concern facing this country).
42. See id. at 1422 ("While the population rose forty percent from 1960 to 1990, violent crime jumped
560 percent."). Eisenberg also stated that thirty percent of those arrested for serious crimes in 1985 were
juveniles. See id.
43. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (1999). One of the saddest results of gang
activity is the death of many innocent children. See Greene, supra note I (listing several instances of child
deaths caused by criminal street gang activity).
44. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1853.
45. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57-58 (Ill. 1997).
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for those areas, testified concerning the specific criminal gang activity.' These
witnesses claimed that gang members "loiter as part of a strategy to claim
territory, recruit new members, and intimidate rival gangs and ordinary
community residents."47 Confirmed by the evidence presented, the city council
found: (1) the increase in criminal street gang activity was "largely responsible"
for Chicago's increase in murder rates, violent crimes, and drug related crimes;
(2) many neighborhoods were experiencing an increased presence of gang
members, which "intimidated many law abiding citizens"; (3) gang members
established control over public areas by "loitering in those areas and intimidating
others from entering those areas"; (4) gang members avoided arrest by not
committing crimes in the presence of police officers; (5) loitering of gang
members "create[d] a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and property"; and
(6) that "aggressive action" would be necessary to manage the situation.48 Based
on its findings, the city council felt there was an "obvious" connection between
gang crime and loitering.49 Thus, Chicago enacted the City of Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance ("Ordinance"), which forbids an individual to loiter on
the streets of Chicago with a known gang member and without an apparent
purpose.'o
E. Police Guidelines
Because Chicago law enforcement felt police policy was the best manner in
which to establish limitations on police discretion in the enforcement of the
Ordinance, such limitations were not directly placed into the language of the
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 58.
49. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 37 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
50. See id. The Ordinance states:(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably
believes to be acriminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons,
he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not
promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this section:
(I) "Loiter" means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association in fact or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its
substantial activities the commission ofone or more of the criminal acts enumerated
in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. (5) "Public place" means the public
way and any other location open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned.
Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992).
Ordinance.51 Instead, the Chicago police department issued General Order 92-4,
which sets forth enforcement standards, including, how to identify criminal street
gangs and how to establish probable cause that a particular person is a criminal
street gang member, in order to ensure the Ordinance would not be arbitrarily
enforced.52 The general order further limits police discretion by giving only those
who are "sworn 'members of the Gang Crime Section' and certain other
designated officers," the authority to arrest pursuant to the Ordinance, and by
requiring those police to "establish detailed criteria for defining street gangs and
members in such gangs."53 Even further, the general order limits police discretion
by restricting the arrests to areas designated as those where gang activity has a
"demonstrable effect on the activities of law abiding persons in the surrounding
community."54 Although these guidelines were in place, once the police started
enforcing the Ordinance, issuing over 89,000 dispersal orders and arresting over
42,000 people, only two trial court judges upheld the constitutionality of the
Ordinance, while eleven others did not.55
F. Anticipation of Crime
There is a fine line between preventing crime and violating an individual's
rights to exercise protected conduct, even if that individual is a known gang
member.56 The Ordinance is an effort to eliminate criminal street gang-related
crime, by anticipating gang member conduct, so as to prevent the crime from ever
being committed." This anticipation of crime is where the Ordinance runs into
problems.5" As soon as police attempted to enforce the Ordinance, the arrestees
challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance and to the distress of the police
department, the arrestees were usually the victors.59 One prime example of where
this occurred is in the case City of Chicago v. Morales, where the Supreme Court
granted Certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the City of Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
5 1. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 n.3 (1999); City of Chicago v. Morales, 687
N.E.2d 53, 58-59 (I11. 997).
52. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 59.
53. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855 (citing Chicago Police Department, General OrderNo92-4 (1992)).
54. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855.
55. See id.; see also Meares and Kahan, supra note 32 at 201 (stating that the courts in Morales and
Youkhana ignored the importance of the police guidelines and the limits the guidelines place on law
enforcement).
56. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (stating that freedoms must be maximized, but order
must also be maintained).
57. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (1999).
58. See Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get First Supreme Court Review, USA
TODAY, April 21, 1998, at B10 ("People should have to be doing something criminal before they are
arrested."').
59. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57 (I11. 997).
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Jesus Morales ("Morales") was found guilty of violating the Ordinance and
was sentenced to jail.6
Previous to Morales's arrest, James Youkhana ("Youkhana") was arrested for
loitering in a public place with a group of people, one of whom was a member of
the Latin Kings criminal street gang, and then failing to disperse after a police
order to do so, in violation of the Ordinance.6 On September 29, 1993, after
challenging the Ordinance on vagueness grounds, the circuit court for Cook
County granted Youkhana's motion to dismiss.62 Cook County appealed to the
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.63 Chicago argued that the
Ordinance is not overbroad, because it does not implicate any first amendment
rights.'4 However, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the circuit court's
opinion.65 The appellate court held that the Ordinance violates the first
amendment of the Illinois Constitution,'M violates due process rights,67 and violates
the fourth amendment.
68
Based on the Youkhana decision, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed
Morales's conviction and Chicago appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.69
Again, Chicago unsuccessfully argued that the Ordinance is not overbroad, vague,
or a status offense.7" The Supreme Court of Illinois Affirmed the Appellate Court
of Illinois, holding that the Ordinance violates due process because "it is
impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal
liberties."'" The United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari and affirms the
Illinois Supreme Court on grounds of vagueness.72
IV. ANALYSIS OF COURT'S OPINION
A. The Plurality Opinion
60. See id.
61. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 37 (III. App. Ct. 1995).
62. See id. at 36.
63. See id. at 34.
64. See id. at 38.
65. See id.
66. See id. (stating that the Ordinance violates the freedom of association, assembly, and expression).
67. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
68. See id. (stating that the Ordinance criminalizes status).
69. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill. 1997).
70. See id. at 59.
71. See id. at 59. The Supreme Court of Illinois did not address the issues of status, probable cause, or
overbreadth. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (1999).
72. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1856.
The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Justice Stevens, held
that the City of Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance is unconstitutional
because the Ordinance "affords too much discretion to the police [in the
enforcement of the ordinance] and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the
public streets."73 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.74
1. Adequate Notice
Justice Stevens reiterates that a law must be created so as to put the reasonable
person on notice of prohibited versus protected conduct.75 Justice Stevens asserts
that the vagueness of the Ordinance is not a product of uncertainty of the ordinary
meaning of the word "loiter," but uncertainty of the meaning of the word "loiter"
provided by the Ordinance.76 In other words, no one will be able to discern if he
or she has an "apparent purpose."77 Justice Stevens states that the Supreme Court
of Illinois followed state court precedent," holding that the Ordinance fails to
distinguish between what is innocent conduct versus what is threatening conduct.79
Justice Stevens agrees with the Supreme Court of Illinois, asserting that the
definition of "loiter" in the Ordinance, "to remain in any one place with no
apparent purpose,"'8 makes it difficult for Chicago citizens standing in a group to
determine if they have an "apparent purpose."8"
Chicago responds to this concern by suggesting that any uncertainty is
resolved when the police administer a dispersal order, which is what provides
73. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1863.
74. See id. The Court does not rely on the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate the Ordinance because the
Court believes the impact of the Ordinance on first amendment rights is not substantial. See id. at 1857.
But see Clark, supra note 19, at 140-43 (stating that the Court neglected the conduct clearly encompassed
by the Ordinance that is protected under the first amendment).
The Court does assert that there is a fundamental right to loiter, however the Court does not
discuss whether the fundamental right to loiter, alone, would invalidate the Ordinance. See City of Chicago
v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857-59 (1999). The freedom to loiter was first recognized in Papachristou,
which stated that loitering has been a historical part of life, even though it is not specifically in the
Constitution. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). Clark states that the
Court should have built on the idea of a fundamental right to loiter instead of mentioning it in passing. See
Clark, supra note 19, at 142-43.
75. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,402-03 (1966));
see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939)).
76. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859. "Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no apparent
purpose." Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992).
77. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999).
78. The state courts upheld ordinances criminalizing loitering when some prohibited act was taking place
in addition to the loitering. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 61 (11. 1997) (listing several
cases upholding loitering ordinances when the act of loitering is in combination with acts such as, begging,
solicitation, or is done in a manner that would cause alarm).
79. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859-60.
80. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code 8-4-015 (1992).
81. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1859; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (citing
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
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citizens with "actual notice."82 Chicago argues that no one is subject to penalty
unless he or she fails to obey the dispersal order. 83 In other words, no one is
subject to penalties until after he or she is given "actual notice" and continues to
partake in the prohibited conduct. However, Justice Stevens is not swayed by
Chicago's argument and gives two reasons why Chicago's argument fails the
Court's review."
a. Conformity to the Law
"[T]he purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen
to conform his or her conduct to the law";85 people should not be required to
speculate as to a law's meaning.86 Justice Stevens claims that if the alleged
loitering is harmless, then ordering a person to disperse would be an impairment
of that person's liberty.87 Justice Stevens reasons that even if no one is subject to
penalties until after he or she is given actual notice and then continues to partake
in the prohibited conduct, the purpose of the Ordinance is to prohibit loitering, not
to punish the refusal to obey a dispersal order.88 Justice Stevens further reasons
that if the police are allowed to randomly decide to whom the Ordinance applies,
the Ordinance is "indistinguishable from the law [] held invalid in
Shuttlesworth."' 9 Justice Stevens asserts that an ordinance should provide people
with adequate warning of what conduct is prohibited in order to avoid police
involvement altogether; an ordinance cannot work retroactively.'
b. Vagueness within Vagueness
Justice Stevens believes that "the terms of the dispersal order compound the
inadequacy of the notice afforded by the ordinance."9 In other words, the terms
82. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (1999).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1860.
86. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
87. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1860.
88. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (1999).
89. See id. Shuttlesworth held that Birmingham's loitering ordinance did not provide clearly defined
rules for law enforcement officials to follow, and thus, law enforcement was afforded too much discretion
in the enforcement of the ordinance. See generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87
(1965).
90. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1860.
91. Morales, 119 S. at 1860. The Court lists questions the terms raise, concerning, the length of time
loiterers must remain apart, the distance to which they must disperse, and whether they may leave and then
return to the same exact place. See id.
of the dispersal order itself are vague. Although probably not enough on its own
to render the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague, Justice Stevens asserts that the
vague terms of the dispersal order only support Justice Stevens's conclusion that
the entire Ordinance fails to give adequate notice.92 Justice Stevens states that the
Constitution does not allow the legislature to apply such a broad application of an
ordinance, leaving it to the courts to determine when the police correctly or
incorrectly gave dispersal orders.93 Therefore, Justice Stevens concludes that
"[t]his ordinance is [] vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in
the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'"'4
2. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement
Minimum guidelines must be set to govern law enforcement; Justice Stevens
asserts that there are "no such guidelines" present in Chicago's gang ordinance. 95
Because the police are not required to inquire into what the apparent purpose of
a group of people may be before giving a dispersal order, Justice Stevens asserts
that the ordinance gives total discretion to the police in determining whether
someone actually has an apparent purpose. 96 Justice Stevens states that a
substantial amount of innocent conduct is covered by the Ordinance, and therefore,
the court must look to the language of the Ordinance, "to determine if it
'necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the
policeman on his beat."' 97
As stated previously, the concern with police discretion develops from the
definition of the term "loiter," defined by the city of Chicago's Ordinance as
"remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose."98 Because the Supreme
Court must construe a state statute in the same manner as that State's highest
court, Justice Stevens asserts that it must follow the interpretation of the term
92. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861.
93. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (1999).
94. See id. (citing Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971) (stating that an ordinance prohibiting
a group of three or more persons from conducting themselves in an annoying manner is vague because what
annoys one may not annoy another, and thus, there is no standard of conduct to which people may
conform)).
95. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861. But see Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 211 (stating that
police discretion must be guided to minimize risks, but does not require "hyper-specific rules").
96. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861. Justice Stevens claims that a gang member may be loitering with
his father by the baseball field either "to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a glimpse of Sammy Sosa
leaving the ballpark," but if a police officer doesn't believe the gang member and his father have an
apparent purpose, the police officer "'shall"' give a dispersal order. See id. Therefore, there are no
guidelines for police officers to follow, and thus, the police have complete discretion in deciding whether
there is an apparent purpose. See id.
97. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (1999) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 359 (1983) (expressing a concern with putting lawmaking in the hands of policemen)). However,
could not the argument be made that all law enforcement is governed by the moment to moment judgment
of the police officers?
98. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861.
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"loiter" given by the Supreme Court of Illinois.' Therefore, according to the
language of the Ordinance as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, police
are given absolute discretion "to determine what activities constitute loitering.""°
However, Chicago disputes this claim of total police discretion, claiming that
officers are limited in three ways: first, officers may not give dispersal orders to
people with an apparent purpose or those moving along, second, officers may not
make arrests if the dispersal order is obeyed, and third, officers may not give a
dispersal order at all unless the officer finds one of the loiterers to be a criminal
street gang member based on that officer's reasonably belief.'01
Even if Justice Stevens was to put aside its requirement to defer to the Illinois
Supreme Court's construction of the statute, Justice Stevens finds all three of
Chicago's arguments insufficient. 2 Justice Stevens rejects Chicago's first
argument, reasoning that even though people who are moving are not subject to
the Ordinance, this limitation, as Chicago calls it, does not address the issue of the
discretion afforded police in determining which stationary persons to order to
disperse. 03 Justice Stevens also rejects Chicago's second argument, reasoning that
although people can not be arrested unless those people disobey a dispersal order,
there is still no guidance as to when the dispersal order should be given."°
Although Justice Stevens agrees that the reasonable belief requirement does place
a limit on police discretion, Justice Stevens asserts that that limitation would only
be sufficient if the Ordinance applied to loitering with an apparently harmful
purpose."' Therefore, Justice Stevens further rejects Chicago's third argument
because it applies to everyone in the city and not just criminal street gang
members."°  Justice Stevens goes so far as to state that not only does the
Ordinance cover innocent conduct, but the Ordinance fails to cover the
intimidating conduct that inspired the very enactment of the Ordinance."
Finally, Justice Stevens asserts that the guidelines to the Ordinance provided
by the police department were not a sufficient defense."°a Justice Stevens reasons
that even if the police are limited by designated areas, that limitation does not
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (1999).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1862. Justice Stevens asserts that the "no apparent purpose" standard is too subjective
because it is placing all discretion in the judgment of the police officer. See id.
105. See id. Justice Stevens states that in his dissent, Justice Thomas overlooks the distinction between
loitering, and loitering that threatened pubic peace. See id.
106. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (1999).
107. See id.
108. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1862.
protect the person who may be arrested somewhere other than the designated
areas. 109
Although Justice Stevens asserts that "the preservation of liberty depends in
part on the maintenance of social order," Justice Stevens claims that the
Ordinance at issue in this case does not give adequate notice, and affords law
enforcement officials too much discretion in the enforcement of the Ordinance." 0
B. The Concurring Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor joined the plurality's decision that the Ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague, reiterating her opinion in Kolender, that the
establishment of minimal guidelines is the most important aspect of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine."' Although Justice O'Connor agrees with Justice Thomas
that police should be afforded some discretion in order to perform their duties,
Justice O'Connor also believes there is a limit and police should not be given the
ability to do standardless sweeps "'to pursue personal predilections.""' 2
Justice O'Connor also agrees with the plurality that the Ordinance lacks
minimum standards sufficient to discern "apparent purpose.""..3 According to
Justice O'Connor, law enforcement officials need not determine if someone is
threatening public order, but can order people to disperse at there own whim."'
Further, Justice O'Connor asserts that the Ordinance applies to too many innocent
people. "5
Justice O'Connor's analysis is important because it contends that the
Ordinance can be corrected." 6 Justice O'Connor suggests that if the Ordinance
would only apply to persons "reasonably believed to be gang members," the
Ordinance may not be vague because the Ordinance would give the police
direction in issuing dispersal orders, by specifically stating to whom the Ordinance
applies."' Justice O'Connor also suggests the Ordinance's definition of the word
"loiter" could have been constructed more narrowly, so as to avoid vagueness."
18
As simple as this modification would be, Justice O'Connor states that the Court
109. See id. This argument seems weak because if a person were arrested somewhere other than the
designated area in conjunction with the Ordinance, that person could challenge the arrest based on the fact
that the Ordinance is inapplicable. In other words, if the arrest took place outside of the designated area,
then the Ordinance could not be used as a basis for that arrest.
110. See id. at 1863 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,471-72 (1987)).
I11. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
113. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor believes that anyone has an apparent purpose,
even if it is merely to stand. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. See City of Chicago v, Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (1999). (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 1864-65 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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cannot interpret the Ordinance in such a manner." 9 Justice O'Connor reiterates
that the Court can only take the construction of the Ordinance given by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, 2 even though Justice O'Connor acknowledges that the
Supreme Court of Illinois misapplied the Court's precedent.' 2 ' Although Justice
O'Connor asserts that the Court has never looked to the drafters' intent to
determine vagueness, the Court "cannot impose a limiting construction that a state
supreme court has declined to adopt."''
Further in her discussion of vagueness, Justice O'Connor restates the
plurality's opinion that the Ordinance's requirement that a group of loiterers
contains a person the police officer "reasonably believes to be a gang member,"
does limit the dispersal authority of police.'23 However, Justice O'Connor believes
that that limitation would only be sufficient if it "restricted the ordinance's
criminal penalties to gang members or [] more carefully delineated the
circumstances in which those penalties would apply to nongang members."'
2
"
Finally, Justice O'Connor asserts that it is important to characterize the
plurality's narrow holding, stating that although this Ordinance is vague, Chicago
still has alternatives.'25
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedyjoins the plurality's decision, but writes separately to express
his concern with the issue of proper notice. 6 Justice Kennedy admits that some
police commands will be given where citizens will be penalized if the command
is not obeyed, even if the citizens do not know why the order was give. 127
However, Justice Kennedy asserts that that does not mean every police order
119. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. See id. at 1865 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court of Illinois misapplied
Papachristou, "as requiring [the Illinois Supreme Court] to hold the ordinance vague in all of its
applications because it was intentionally drafted in a vague manner").
122. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355-56 n.4 (1983)).
123. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 1865 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor refers to Illinois statutes concerning
intimidation, drug conspiracy, the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Act, and mob action, as well as
Chicago's general disorderly conduct provision. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the plurality at
1857 n. 17). In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out that of the criminal street gang conduct complained about
at the hearings, ninety percent of that conduct is actual criminal conduct where people can be arrested. See
Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857 n.17 (Stevens, J., plurality).
126. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
should be followed "without notice of the lawfulness of the order."'" Justice
Kennedy does not believe the dispersal order is enough to remove uncertainty as
to what conduct is prohibited by the Ordinance." 9 Justice Kennedy asserts that a
citizen has no way to discern what an officer may perceive, whether in regards to
the citizen's conduct or to characteristics of someone with whom the citizen is
congregating, and thus, the notice requirement is not satisfied.
30
3. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer joins the plurality's decision, and writes separately to express
his belief that the Ordinance creates a major limit on the free state of nature.131
Justice Breyer begins his opinion by disregarding Justice Scalia's sentiment that
the Ordinance is only a minor limitation. 132  Justice Breyer reasons that the
Ordinance is not a minor limitation, but a major limitation, because the Ordinance
delegates unfettered discretion to the police. 33 Further, Justice Breyer states that
neither the requirement of the presence of a gang member in the group of loiters,
nor the "no apparent purpose" requirement saves the Ordinance."3 In fact, Justice
Breyer says, "Chicago may no more apply [the Ordinance] to the defendant, no
matter how [he] behaved, than could it apply an (imaginary) statute that said, '[i]t
is a crime to do wrong,' even to the worst of murderers."' 35 Justice Breyer
concludes that the Ordinance is invalid in all its applications, not because of
insufficient notice, but because of insufficient minimum standards to guide the
police. 136
Finally, Justice Breyer states that an ordinance needs to be drafted with
reasonable specificity as to which conduct is prohibited, instead of giving law
enforcement total discretion, which in effect allows the police to give dispersal
orders whenever the police are annoyed with any particular person.'37
128. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 1865 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134. See id. (Breyer, I., concurring). Justice Breyer states that the requirement that a gang member be
present limits police discretion to a point, but it still encompasses too many innocent people. See id.
(Breyer, J., concurring). Also, Justice Breyer states that an individual always has some purpose, and
therefore, the Ordinance requires the police to "interpret the words 'no apparent purpose' as meaning 'no
apparent purpose except for .. " See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1866 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939)).
136. See Morales, 119S. Ct. at 1866 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer contends that Justice Scalia
reaches a different conclusion, because Justice Scalia is applying a different basis to determine constitutional
invalidity. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
137. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1865 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (comparing Morales to Coates v.
Cincinnaty, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting individuals from conducting
themselves in an annoying way violates the due process standard of vagueness)).
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C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion,"' "mock[ing] the notion of 'the
Fundamental Freedom to Loiter' and scorn[ing] the plurality's decision as
'entirely irrational."" 39 Justice Scalia begins his analysis with examples of past
situations where the people of Chicago Were willing to restrict constitutional
freedoms, in order to reap a larger benefit." Justice Scalia believes that the
people of Chicago are more than willing to restrict a few personal freedoms in
order to eliminate, or at least reduce, the gang problems that are plaguing some
Chicago neighborhoods, which would be a small price to pay for liberation of
Chicago streets.'4 ' Justice Scalia asserts that the plurality invalidated a perfectly
sound measure, attacking the plurality on several grounds.'42
a. Facial Challenges
Justice Scalia looks far back into precedent, and questions whether the Court
even has a right to determine that a law is invalid in all its applications, pursuant
to a facial challenge."'3 Referencing Tocqueville, Justice Scalia asserts that
judicial power is to be exercised in relation to each case before the Court, and not
to general principles.'" Justice Scalia reasons, that if the Court "'directly attacks
a general principle without having a particular case in view, [the Court] leaves the
circle in which all nations have agreed to confine [the Court's] authority; [the
court] assumes a more important, and perhaps a more useful influence.""" Justice
Scalia goes on to say that "'[w]e have no power per se to review and annul acts of
138. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1867 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at Al.
140. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia states that prophylactic speed
limits were imposed to ensure safe operation of cars, which was a constitutional restriction on a freedom,
and that laws were enacted allowing police to order people to disperse from the scene of an accident in an
attempt to prevent more accidents, and this was also a constitutional restriction on a freedom. See id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1867-68 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (stating that the Court has power to review federal legislation
only to decide the specific case before the Court)).
144. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional."" 46 Justice Scalia states
that the Court must follow two rules: (1) never anticipate a constitutional law
question before the need to decide that question, and (2) never formulate a
constitutional law broader than necessary for any set of particular facts. 47 Justice
Scalia reasons that going beyond how a statute is applied to the case before the
Court does not mesh with the system, asserting that the Court should not even give
its opinion as to whether a statute would be constitutional in other contexts."
Although Justice Scalia feels strong on this matter, he does acknowledge that the
Court has been doing exactly what Justice Scalia says it should not do for quite
some time. 49
b. Loitering as a Fundamental Right
Justice Scalia believes that there is no fundamental right to loiter, stating that
in fact, there has been a long history of criminalizing such activity. 5 ° Going back
to history, Justice Scalia strongly asserts it is not maintainable that the framers
intended loitering to be a fundamental liberty, and accuses the plurality of using
"the historical practices of our people [as] nothing more than a speed bump on the
road to the 'right' result."'15' Justice Scalia criticizes the plurality's application of
substantive due process, stating that it "leaps far beyond any substantive-due-
process atrocity [the Court has] ever committed."'5
c. Mens Rea
Justice Scalia disagrees with the plurality's opinion that loitering is part of the
offense requiring mens rea.' Justice Scalia states that the only act made
punishable by the Ordinance is that of the failure to obey a dispersal order, not the
act of loitering, and therefore, "[t]he willful failure to obey a police order is
wrongful intent enough."'1
54
146. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923)).
147. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1868-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 1869 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1869 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 1872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia goes so far as to regard substantive due
process as "judicial usurpation." See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court actually places the burden on
the Plaintiff to show that loitering is not a fundamental liberty. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens says that Scalia is wrong for mentioning this because Justice Stevens evaluates Morales under
procedural due process. See id. at 1863 n.35 (Stevens, J., plurality). However, Justice Scalia replies that
he is merely pointing out that liberty cannot mean one thing for procedural due process and another for
substantive. See id. at 1873 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also criticizes the concurring opinions,
stating that they "make no pretense at attaching their broad 'vagueness invalidates' rule to a liberty interest.
See id. at 1874 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1874 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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d. Vagueness
In considering the issue of vagueness, Justice Scalia has but one thing to say;
the Ordinance is not vague.'55 Even if the Court were to apply the overbreadth
standard, Justice Scalia still believes the Ordinance would not be considered
vague.56 In his analysis, Justice Scalia examines the two aspects of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, and comments on why be believes the plurality is wrong.5 7
e. Adequate Notice
In his consideration of the first aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
Justice Scalia reiterated the plurality's opinion that loitering is the conduct the
Ordinance prohibits. "' However, Justice Scalia asserts that the focus of vagueness
analysis should be on what the Ordinance actually subjects to criminal penalty,
which Justice Scalia believes to be the failure to obey a dispersal order, and not on
what the ordinance prohibits.5 9 Justice Scalia asserts there can be no doubt that
adequate notice is given by the dispersal order."6 Although the plurality claims
the dispersal order itself is vague, Justice Scalia practically laughs at the
plurality's opinion, stating that the plurality's opinion "scarcely requires a
response."' 161 Justice Scalia contends that if the dispersal order was in fact vague,
than many of the Presidential proclamations issued pursuant to Title ten, section
334 of the United States Code would also be vague, and thus, unconstitutional. 62
f Arbitrary and Discriminatory Law Enforcement
While evaluating the second aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, Justice
Scalia asserts that the plurality [hid] behind an artificial construct of judicial
155. See id. at 1875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). If a law reaches a substantial amount of protected activity, that law
is unconstitutional under overbreadth analysis. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia contends that
the Ordinance would not be vague in most applications. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1875-79 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 1875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Section 334 requires the President to order insurgents
to disperse before using the militia or the Armed Forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 334. As an example, Justice
Scalia cites President Eisenhower's proclamation, relating to the enrollment of black students in a white
school, which states, "I... command all persons engaged in such obstruction ofjustice to cease and desist
therefrom, and to disperse forthwith." See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
restraint."' 63 Just as Justice Scalia accuses the plurality of using the history of the
people as a bump in the road to get to the "right result,"'" Justice Scalia appears
to be taking the same type of approach to arrive at his own right result.'65
Although it is true that the Court must adhere to the construction of the
Ordinance given by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Justice Scalia interprets the
situation differently than the plurality. '66 Justice Scalia contends that the Supreme
Court of Illinois did not construct the language as giving police total discretion,
but made a conclusion of law. 67 To conclusions of law, Justice Scalia states, the
Court is not bound.
68
Justice Scalia states that the dispersal order criteria could not be more clear;
first because it says "reasonably believe," and second, because of the "no apparent
purpose" requirement. 69 Further, Justice Scalia states that the real problem
Justice Stevens has with the ordinance, is that the Ordinance proscribes too much
harmless conduct.' 0 However, Justice Scalia asserts that that is not a decision to
be made by the Court; the Court has no business "second-guessing either the
degree of necessity or the fairness of the trade."''
2. Justice Thomas
"[T]he Court has unnecessarily sentenced law-abiding citizens to lives of
terror and misery."' 7
2
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, expressing his concern that the
Court does not give enough consideration to the terror criminal street gangs inflict
upon poor and vulnerable citizens, "often relegating [those citizens] to the status
of prisoners in their own home."' 73
Justice Thomas believes that "[t]he ordinance does nothing more than confirm
the well-established principle that the police have the duty and the power to
maintain the public peace, and, when necessary, to disperse groups of individuals
who threaten [the public peace]."'7
163. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1876 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 1872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 1876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1876 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 1879 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1879 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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a. Loitering as a Constitutional Right
Justice Thomas asserts that the freedom to loiter is in no way deeply rooted
in history or tradition.'75 Justice Thomas contends that the plurality accounts for
anti-loitering laws by suggesting the anti-loitering laws are out of their proper
historical time frame, referring back in time to a less sophisticated era.'7 6
However, Justice Thomas believes that the plurality's sweeping conclusion, based
only on the citation of three cases,' "withers when exposed to the relevant
history."'7 8 One of the cases the plurality cites is Papachristou. 79 Justice Thomas
states that the Court in Papachristou did not apply the now-accepted analysis
applied in substantive due process cases, which is looking to tradition to define the
rights protected by the Due Process Clause."W But, Justice Thomas reasons that
is irrelevant because a careful reading of Papachristou reveals that the Court never
claimed loitering was a constitutional right.'' Justice Thomas asserts that "[we]
should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content into the
Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to
promote its welfare."'8 2 Justice Thomas reasons that the Judiciary is without
constitutional authority to do so.'83
b. Unconstitutionally Vague
Justice Thomas believes that the Ordinance is not vague, disagreeing with the
plurality's opinion that the Ordinance does not limit police discretion or afford
residents with adequate notice.a'4
175. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believes loitering is one of the liberties protected
by DPC of the 14th, yet the Court acknowledges that "anti-loitering ordinances have long existed in this
country." See id. at 1857 n.20 (Stevens, J., plurlaity). Justice Thomas contends that Justice Stevens
disregards past case law that should guide the Court's analysis. See id. at 1883 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6, (1989)).
176. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1881 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 1857-58 (Stevens, J., plurality).
178. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1881-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1882-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1881-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1883 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
c. Arbitrary Enforcement
Justice Thomas believes the Ordinance adequately channels police
discretion.'85 Justice Thomas asserts that the Ordinance is not a criminalization
of the act of loitering, but a penalty for those loiterers who fail to obey a dispersal
order. '86 The Ordinance is a tool for law enforcement officials to fulfill one of the
many traditional duties for which law enforcement is responsible; preserving the
public peace.'87 Justice Thomas asserts that police officers "wear other hats,"
stating that enforcement of criminal laws is not the sole responsibility of law
enforcement.' 88 And it is in the role of peace officer, that the Justice Thomas
believes the police have had the authority, and duty, to order people to disperse. 89
Justice Thomas refers to police officers as peace-makers and inherent in that
position is the law's trust that the police officers will be responsible when
exercising discretion."'°
Though Justice Thomas agrees there must be guidelines, he also states there
must not be rigid constraints.' 9' Justice Thomas believes the Ordinance is an
effective balance between total discretion, and rigid constraints. Justice Thomas
reasons that because the police are trusted to exercise discretion when making spur
of the moment decisions about legal standards, so to should the police be trusted
to exercise their discretion reasonably when determining whether a group of
loiterers threaten the public peace.'92 "[T]he Courts conclusion that the ordinance
is impermissibly vague because it 'necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-
to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat,' cannot be reconciled with
common sense, longstanding police practice, or this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence."'93  Further, Justice Thomas does not believe the plurality's
suggestion on how to correct the Ordinance is an adequate alternative, stating that
the plurality's suggestion lacks the scienter requirement the plurality claims is
required. "9 Because of this lack of scienter element, Justice Thomas states that
the Hoffman Estates 95 standard is not satisfied, nor is police discretion
channeled. '9 Justice Thomas goes so far to state that Justice Stevens's alternative,
185. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1883 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 1884 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1885 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The plurality suggests that the Ordinance would be sufficient if
it applied only to loitering that "had an apparently harmful purpose or effect." See id. at 1862 (Stevens,
J., plurality). But, "[Tlhe criminality of the conduct would continue to depend on its external appearance,
rather than the loiterer's state of mind." Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
196. See id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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requiring police officers to ascertain the existence of "an apparently harmful
purpose," gives police more discretion instead of less.'97
Justice Thomas does acknowledge there is a possibility that mistakes will be
made and some police may act in bad faith.'98 However, Justice Thomas feels
these possibilities are rare and "best addressed when (and if) they arise, rather than
prophylactically through the disfavored mechanism of a facial challenge on
vagueness grounds.'"
d. Adequate Notice
Justice Thomas believes there is nothing vague about a dispersal order, and
that almost everyone should have little difficulty understanding how to comply.2"
Concerning the respondent's burden to prove the Ordinance is unconstitutional in
all its applications to satisfy a facial challenge, Justice Thomas states that his view
is the same as retired Justice White's dissenting opinion in Kolender, which is, an
enactment is not unconstitutional "[i]f any fool would know that a particular
category of conduct would be within the reach of the [Ordinance] . 2."1 Justice
Thomas agrees with the Supreme Court of Illinois, contending that the term
"loiter" has a common meaning among intelligent people, and the Ordinance is
exactly the type of ordinance where "any fool" would know what conduct is within
the Ordinance's reach."2 Justice Thomas asserts that although the meaning of the
word "loiter" may be imprecise, it is similar to other legal terms, such as, "fraud,"
bribery," and "perjury," the meaning of which the Court expects people to know."°3
197. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1885 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas also believes the Ordinance afford police less discretion as is, because police officers are only
required to determine that one person in the group is a gang member. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). If
police were to determine that all persons in the group were gang members, that would require the police
officers to make several determinations instead of one, thus affording the police even more discretion. See
id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1885-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. See id. 1886 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas suggests that if the plurality's opinion
were followed, the police will ever be able to issue dispersal orders. See id. at 1886 n.9 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
201. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1886 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas states that Justice Stevens's assertion that the
Ordinance covers too much protected or innocent conduct iserroneous because there is no fundamental right
to loiter; it is conduct that has consistently been criminalized. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 1886 & n. 10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas believes that Justice Stevens is
underestimating Chicago citizens, stating that individuals are perfectly capable of discerning how they are
perceived by others. See id. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 584
(1974) (White, J., concurring)).
When determining if the Ordinance is vague, Justice Thomas answers with a firm
,,no.,,1204
Justice Thomas concludes by stating that the plurality has the ability to
concentrate on the "rights" of gang members, because the Justices will not feel the
impact of their decision; they do not live gang territory. 5 The people who will
feel the impact of the Morales decision are those who are afraid to leave their
homes, afraid to step onto the streets, and afraid to shop.2'
V. IMPACT OF COURT'S DECISION
"Too much freedom breeds anarchy; too much order breeds tyranny." 20 7 There
is a constant tension between individual autonomy and the community243
Although some claim constitutional rights should not be restrained at any cost,
2°9
many others believe there must be a certain level of restriction on liberty to
maintain law and order." ° Society as a whole takes interest in the conduct of its
citizens because of the desire to maintain a civilized society that all people can live
in and enjoy. Thus, "[b]y entering society, individuals give up the unrestrained
right to act as they think fit; in return, each has a positive right to society's
protection."22 ' The function of the state is to create the laws, from which the
people derive these positive rights of protection.2 2 Therefore, "[t]he state has not
only a right to 'maintain a decent society,' but an obligation to do so.
' 2t 3
As is the situation with any case involving a constitutional issue, the decision
handed down in Morales has made its mark and opinions have varied drastically
regarding the result.
Justice Thomas states in his dissenting opinion, that "the Court today has
denied our most vulnerable citizens the very thing that Justice Stevens elevates
above all else-the 'freedom of movement.' And that is a shame. '214 Others
believe that gang members' liberties should be secondary to the liberties of local
residents who are living in fear. 215 Two professors of law at the University of
204. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1887 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. See James Kilpatrick, Fine Line Between Liberty and Order, ST. J.-REG. (Ill.), Dec. 22, 1998, at
6; see also ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997) ("Liberty unrestrained is an invitation
to anarchy.").
208. See Kilpatrick, supra note 207.
209. See Thomas L. Doerr, Jr., A Failed Attempt to Take Back Our Streets-A Constitutional Triumph
for Gangs: City of Chicago v. Morales, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 447,469 (1999) ("[C]onstitutional rights are
guaranteed to every U.S. citizen, regardless of whom they decide to associate with.").
210. See generally Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) ("Our Constitution is designed to
maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty.").
211. See ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
212. See id. at 618.
213. See id. at 603 (citation omitted).
214. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1887 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215. See Christy Gutowski, Liberty vs. Safety DuPage 's Lawsuit Against Alleged Gang Pits Personal
Freedoms Against Personal Protection, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Dec. 6, 1999, at 6. "Dupage State's
Attorney Joseph Birkett said[,]'[nlo community shouldever be required to endure the outrageous conditions
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Chicago Law School believe that the Morales decision "demonstrates respect for
individual liberty by destroying ever greater amounts of it." '216 The Chicago
Neighborhood Organizations feel the Ordinance "strikes a reasonable balance
between liberty and order." '217 Even a parent, whose child is in jail for a gang-style
murder, supports the Ordinance "as a morally responsible way to steer community
youth away from gang life and to counter ... young lives wasted in prison. ''2 8
Those who oppose the Ordinance assert that it ignores citizens' basic rights
in an attempt to appear tough on crime.219 Many believe that sacrificing liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution "open[s] the door too wide"; denying too many
rights of law-abiding citizens.22 One commentator asserts that the Latin Kings
of Chicago, a resident gang, has "the same right of peaceable assembly that the
Constitution accords to us all," stating that the Ordinance is "not a tolerable
solution to an intolerable situation." 21
In light of these opinions, it is clear that the aftermath of the Morales decision
will greatly impact the lives of many people, and leave law enforcement officials
with few options.
A. Burden on Law Enforcement
The Morales decision will most likely be a hindrance upon the ability of law
enforcement to continue cracking down on criminal gang activity. Chicago claims
that the violence attributable to criminal gang activity dropped substantially while
these gangs' members pursue."' Id.
216. See Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 213 (stating that the elimination of crime prevention
measures subjects gang members to more severe punishment).
217. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 5, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121). The Chicago Neighborhood Organizations state that
safeguards exist against abusive enforcement because of the guidelines set out in the Oridnance's
regulations. See id.; see also Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 200. The Chicago Neighborhood
Organizations further assert that the Ordinance is a means of reforming the community, instead of "trying
to bludgeon gang members into submission through severe punishment." See Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 22, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-
1121).
218. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 17, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121).
219. See Steve Lash, High-Court Ruling Says Anti-Gang Law is Unconstitutional, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 11, 1999, at 2.
220. See Gutowski, supra note 215; see also Doerr, supra note 209, at 469 (stating that the Ordinance
jeopardizes the constitutional rights guaranteed to every citizen).
221. See James Kilpatrick, Do Gang Members Have the Right to Loiter?, ST. J.-REG. (I11.), Aug. 27,
1998, at 5.
the Ordinance was in effect.222 Homicides attributable to criminal street gangs
decreased by twenty-six percent after the Ordinance was in effect, yet increased
after the Ordinance was found unconstitutional.223 Victor Borrego, a former
member of the Satan Disciples gang, admitted that some gang members have left
towns in order to avoid the penalty for violating the Ordinance.224 Barbara Sternik
of the Northwest Neighborhood Federation also noted that gang members would
only congregate for a few minutes before moving on while the Ordinance was in
effect. 2 5 By ruling the Ordinance unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has
severely limited the Chicago law enforcement officials' abilities to deter and
maintain criminal street gang activity. The Court has also restricted the options
police have for dealing with gang members, forcing police to develop other time
consuming and burdensome alternatives for monitoring criminal street gangs. In
the meantime, gang members are probably more likely to engage in criminal
activity they may have been apprehensive to commit while the Ordinance was in
place.
B. Anti-Gang Legislation
1. California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act
With nearly 600 criminal street gangs and a steady increase in the number of
gang related murders, California is in a state of crisis. 226 In an effort towards
eliminating criminal street gang activity, California enacted the Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act ("STEP").227 STEP punishes "any person who
actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that
gang."22 Further, STEP declares any building used for criminal street gang
activity a nuisance,229 punishes adults who use "physical violence to coerce,
222. Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get First Supreme Court Review, USA TODAY,
April 21, 1998, at B10.
223. See Scott Ritter, Chicago Loitering Law Targeting Gangs Draws Skepticism of Some on High
Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B22; see also Fran Spielman, Supreme Court to Review City's
Gang Loitering Law, CHICAGO SUN TIMEs, April 21, 1998, at 18.
224. See Rob D. Kaiser, Suits Targeting Gangs Have Town Split in Two, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1999,
at 1.
225. See Fran Spielman, Supreme Court to Review City's Gang Loitering Law, CHICAGO SUN TIMES,
April 21, 1998, at 18.
226. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2000).
227. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.28 (West 2000). Several other states have also enacted
statutes similar to STEP. See David R. Truman, The Jets and Sharks are Dead: State Statutory
Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 735 n.27 (1995) (discussing different
approaches to dealing with criminal street gangs); see also Bart H. Rubin, Hail, Hail, the Gangs are All
Here: Why New York Should Adopt a Comprehensive Anti-Gang Statute, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033,
2063-71 (1998) (analyzing several state anti-gang statutes).
228. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2000).
229. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a(a) (West 2000).
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induce, or solicit" minors to participate in criminal street gang activity,23 ° and
allows for sentence enhancements for gang related crimes.2 1' Although STEP is
a successful tool for fighting criminal gang activity, a problem still exists.232
When a gang member is punished pursuant to STEP, the crime has already been
committed; a right has been violated or someone has been injured.233 As can be
discerned from this note, law enforcement officials are striving to find ways to
prevent criminal street gang activity, not just another way to punish gang members
for such activity. Punishment for crimes pursuant to STEP, although gang
specific, does not appear to be any different than punishment for other crimes
pursuant to statutes already in place. Therefore, creating anti-gang legislation
similar to STEP would not be a helpful alternative to Chicago law enforcement
because it is time consuming, expensive, and not a preventative measure.2
34
2. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Another method that has been successful in combating criminal gang activity
is through the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). 235 RICO prohibits the use of any income derived from racketeering
activities to gain an interest in,23 or maintain an enterprise.237 Further, RICO
requires the forfeiture of all proceeds gained from such racketeering activities
upon conviction. 238 RICO is used against criminal street gangs, by classifying its
activity as "racketeering. ' 239 Thus, the benefit to RICO is that in addition to
punishing specific gang members for their personal offenses, RICO attacks the
criminal street gang as a whole, by reducing that gang's economic control over its
criminal enterprise.' 4
Although criminal forfeiture provisions such as RICO have proven to be a
powerful tool against criminal street gangs, it too faces the problem that STEP
230. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26(a) (West 2000).
231. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2000).
232. See Bergen Herd, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-Related Problems in California: After
People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 629, 676 (1998)
(analyzing the California Supreme Court's decision in ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997)).
233. See id.
234. See Truman, supra note 227, at 706-10 (discussing STEP and its requirements).
235. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2000).
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (West 2000).
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (West 2000).
238. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (West 2000).
239. See Herd, supra note 232, at 633; see also Rubin, supra note 227, at 2048-54 (discussing how
criminal street gangs qualify for RICO prosecution).
240. See Truman, supra note 227, at 687-88; see also Herd, supra note 232 at 633 (discussing anti-gang
legislation).
faces; it punishes gang members after the offenses have been committed, instead
of preventing the offense from ever taking place.24" ' Using RICO as a tool against
gangs would not be a helpful alternative for Chicago law enforcement, because it
is time consuming, expensive, and not a preventative measure. 2'
3. Public Nuisance Injunctions
The purpose of the public nuisance doctrine is to protect the common interests
of society in order to maintain an ideal civil life,243 and there is nothing civil about
the lives of citizens living is cities plagued by criminal street gangs.244
Rocksprings, California is a town that has been taken over by the "[m]urder,
attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson, and
theft" of criminal street gangs, who have used neighborhood homes as urinals and
escape routes."45 A Rocksprings resident stated that "gang members had
threatened to cut out the tongue of her nine-year old daughter if [the daughter]
talked to the police."" 6 In an attempt to control the public safety and order in
Rocksprings, injunctions were issued against criminal street gangs and gang
members constituting a public nuisance.247
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna 24 was the first case to address a public nuisance
injunction that prohibited both legal and illegal activity of criminal street gang
members. 9 The Acuna court determined that the injunction did not violate the
defendant's first amendment right to associate or fifth amendment guarantee of
due process, the injunction was not vague or overbroad, and the criminal street
gang activity fit within the definition of a public nuisance.25 After the public
nuisance injunction was implemented, improvements in Rocksprings were evident;
911 calls decreased by forty-five percent, narcotic crime arrests fell from sixty-two
to sixteen, and in one year the violent crime rate dropped by eighty-four percent."
Unlike STEP and RICO, the importance of public nuisance injunctions is that
the injunctions encompass legal activity, allowing law enforcement officials to
focus on the prevention of crime instead of punishment for crimes already
241. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2000).
242. See generally Truman, supra note 227. Truman points out that RICO is time consuming and
expensive because prosecutors must rely on wiretaps, informants, and the likelihood of gang members
turning states evidence. See Truman, supra note 227, at 735 n.228.
243. See ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
244. See id. at 601-03.
245. See id. at 601.
246. See id. at 613.
247. Public health, safety, peace, comfort, and convenience are five categories of rights, the unreasonable
interference of which may constitute a public nuisance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B,
subd. (2)(a) (1999); see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3479 (West 2000).
248. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
249. See id.; see also Herd, supra note 232, at 641; Gregory S. Walston, Taking the Constitution at its
Word: A Defense of the Use of Anti-Gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 47 (1999) (discussing the
decision in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna).
250. See generally Acuna, 929 P.2d 596; see generally also Herd, supra note 232.
251. See Herd, supra note 232, at 674-75.
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committed. 2 However, similar to STEP and RICO, public nuisance injunctions
must be very specific, and they are extremely time consuming and expensive.253
Although California has had much success with the public nuisance injunctions,
Chicago's anti-gang ordinance would have made the fight against gangs much
easier.' The Ordinance was drafted with the intent to cover a larger area of the
city of Chicago, and in an attempt to avoid the burdensome process of targeted
court orders. 5 With the Ordinance in effect, Chicago would be able to avoid the
difficulties of the public nuisance injunctions, streamlining the anti-gang effort. 6
C. Desperate Times, Desperate Measures?
Although police in other areas have attempted different alternatives for
dealing with gang activity, such as the 18th Street Gang 7 in Los Angeles, those
efforts have proven to do more damage than good.25 In an attempt to eliminate
gang activity, the Los Angeles Police Department created an elite anti-gang unit
called Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums ("CRASH"). 9 The duties
of the specialized CRASH officers were to collect intelligence on gang members
and destroy gang activity.2 ' Unfortunately, what was intended to be a cure turned
into its own problem. CRASH, also known as "TRASH," Total Resources Against
252. See Herd, supra note 232, at 637-38; see also Walston, supra note 249, at 74 ("Anti-gang
injunctions are one of the most promising methods of curbing urban violence."). Even Harvey Grossman
of the ACLU acknowledges the success of public nuisance injunctions because they "are targeted with
'surgical precision' to a small number of people and a particular area." See David G. Savage, Anti-Gang
Loitering Bad Worries Justices Supreme Court: Law Allowing Arrests in Chicago of Suspected
Members who Stand on the Street in Assailed. 'There are no Standards for Police' Kennedy Says, L.A.
TIMES, December 10, 1998, at A3.
253. See David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at
Al. Public nuisance injunctions are limited to specific blocks, must identify specific gang members, and
take an average of four to five months of court hearings before they can be issued. See id.; see also David
G. Savage, Supreme Court to Rule on Gang Loitering Curbs, L.A. TIMES, April 21, 1998, at Al. Further,
if the gangs move outside of the specific blocks, law enforcement officials have to spend more time in court.
See David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at Al.
254. See David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Ban on Gang Loitering, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at
At.
255. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Rule on Gang Loitering Curbs, L.A. TIMES, April 21,
1998, at AI.
256. See id.
257. 18' Street Gang is Los Angeles's biggest and most violent gang. See LA. 's Dirty War on Gangs:
A Trail of Corruption Leads to Some of the City's Toughest Cops, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 19355092.
258. See infra notes 259-264 and accompanying text.
259. See The LAPD: Over-Creative Policing, ECONOMIST, September 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL
7364657.
260. See id.
Street Hoodlums, is now best known for its ultra-aggressive tactics and has been
referred to as acting like a gang themselves.26" ' Accusations have been made that
CRASH members have dropped gang members in rival territory, participated in
police brutality, perjury, and the planting of evidence, and have even gone as far
as shooting an unarmed 18th Street gang member, at point blank range, and then
planting a weapon on the gang member to claim self defense.262 Law enforcement,
as well as city council members across the country see an increase in criminal
street gang activity and feel the pressure from the communities to make it go
away.263 It is quite possible to assume that the decision handed down in Morales
could lead the police of Chicago to the same type of vigilante attitudes as the
police in Los Angeles; they may give up on legislature and take matters into their
own hands."6
D. Time to Take the Law into Our Own Hands?
In Cicero, a Chicago suburb, criminal street gang members loiter, intimidate,
and establish control over the neighborhood, and they do so with indifference.' 6
Roberto Padilla, a member of the Latin Kings, laughed while perusing a Cicero
lawsuit with his name and the names of fellow gang members, commenting that
Cicero "don't even got half of them."2' Another member, Antonio Ascensio,
claims that his civil rights are being violated, stating, "[wihat do they want us to
be, the town of Pleasantville?"267 All of the homicides in Cicero in 1998 were
gang related.268
Garlen Gean, a neighbor in a community that has been all but taken over by
criminal street gangs, has two review mirrors he uses to monitor for the presence
261. See LA. 's Dirty War on Gangs: A Trail of Corruption Leads to Some of the City's Toughest
Cops, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19355092 (quoting defense lawyer Dennis
Chang).
262. Rafeal A. Perez has confessed to just such actions because he was caught stealing drugs from the
police evidence locker. See L.A. 's Dirty War on Gangs: A Trail of Corruption Leads to Some of the
City's Toughest Cops, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19355092. In return fora better
sentence, Perez is cooperating with police by whistleblowing on his partners. See id. The questions still
remains whether what he says is completely accurate, or a simple attempt to stay out ofjail. Perez has also
claimed police have lied in court. See id.
263. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 21, City of Chicago
v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1 999)(No. 97-1121) (discussing the testimony during Chicago's city council
meetings).
264. Cf LA. 's Dirty War on Gangs: A Trail of Corruption Leads to Some of the City's Toughest
Cops, NEWSWEEK, Oct. I1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19355092 (stating that Los Angeles police are
acting like gangs).
265. Cf Betty Loren, Ridding Cicero of Gangs, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1999, at 14, and Rob D. Kaiser,
Suits Targeting Gangs Have Town Split in Two, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1999, at 1.
266. See Rob D. Kaiser, Suits Targeting Gangs Have Town Split in Two, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1999,
at 1.
267. See id.
268. See Betty Loren, Ridding Cicero of Gangs, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1999, at 14.
[Vol. 28: 221, 2000] Chicago v. Morlales
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of gang members before stepping outside onto the streets. 69 Gean has lived in his
house for twenty years, he is fed up with the gang problem, and he wants to do
something about the problem.7 ' The Morales decision may indirectly force
Chicago residents to develop an "if you can't beat them, join them" attitude, take
on the problem themselves, and start committing their own crimes. 7' The Court
seems to be very liberal in giving liberties to people, without first considering the
possible adverse effects of that decision; people are petrified to leave their homes
and walk the streets.272
People who live in these neighborhoods are frustrated, they are afraid, and
they want to take action.273 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has just taken away
what seemed to be the only legal opportunity the people had to take such action. 4
E. Legislative Impact
The Morales decision may create a lot of problems for legislation. Because
the Ordinance in Morales was ruled unconstitutional, states that have enacted or
are drafting ordinances similar ordinances will also have to come up with some
other means of anti-gang legislation. Also, because the Court was overly
particular with its analysis of the wording of the Ordinance, it will be even more
difficult for Chicago and other states to redraft their ordinances.275 But, is that
necessarily true?
As the Ordinance stands, a police officer may issue a dispersal order if there
is a group of loiterers, one of whom the police officer "reasonably believes to be
a criminal street gang member. '27 6 Even though Justice O'Connor asserts that this
requirement does not correct the Ordinance's vagueness, she also asserts that the
Ordinance's vagueness may be eliminated if the Ordinance is modified to apply
269. Rob D. Kaiser, Suits Targeting Gangs Have Town Split in Two, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1999, at 1.
Some residents are even being driven out of the neighborhoods. See id. ('I probably will move out of
Cicero just to get rid of the headaches."').
270. See id.
271. Cf Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 19-2 1, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121) (discussing the effects of gang intimidation on children).
272. "Allowing gang members to exercise their full rights makes life hell for people who live in the area."
Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get First Supreme Court Review, USA TODAY, April
21, 1998, at IA.
273. See Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get First Supreme Court Review, USA
TODAY, April 21, 1998, at IA.
274. See id.
275. See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999); see generally also Morales,
119 S. Ct. 1849 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
276. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992).
only to those "reasonably believed to be gang members." '277 Is Justice O'Connor
suggesting that all Chicago has to do to correct the Ordinance is remove the words
"shall order all such persons to disperse" and replace them with the words "shall
order the person reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member to
disperse"?278 Is it that easy? If this is what Justice O'Connor is suggesting,
Morales seems to be a case of form over substance, where Chicago simply has not
made it past the red tape of a proper ordinance.279 Further, if this is what Justice
O'Connor is suggesting, is she then in agreeance with those who believe criminal
street gang members do not have a right to loiter, while those who are not criminal
street gang members do, thus suggesting the liberties of some should be restricted
to protect the majority?"
If Chicago redrafts the Ordinance in the manner suggested by Justice
O'Connor, and it is brought before the Court, Justice O'Connor will likely approve
of the new Ordinance, as well as Justice Kennedy, who is also concerned with
putting people on notice concerning to whom the Ordinance applies, and thus, a
different outcome.2"'
F. Any Suggestions?
1. Tolerate Vagueness
It has been contended that a certain amount of vagueness is acceptable when
outweighed by the pursuit of a significant legislative end.282 A certain amount of
negative consequences due to the enforcement of a statute should be tolerated
because of the severity of the crime.283 An example of where this idea has occurred
in the past is with an obscenity law, discussed in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,2 4
277. See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1864 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
278. See id.
279. See Betty Loren, Ridding Cicero of Gangs, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1999, at 14.
280. See Tony Mauro, City Ordinances Targeting Gangs to get First Supreme Court Review, USA
TODAY, April 21, 1998, at IA ("Allowing gang members to exercise their full rights makes life hell for
people who live in the area."). Cf Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (stating that public order must
be maintained to maximize freedoms).
281. "[Wlhen this Court is confronted with a more specifically worded ordinance, which avoids the mire
of vagueness, the Court will likely find that community safety concerns outweigh an individual's
fundamental liberty interests." Clark, supra note 19, at 146 (stating that the Justices are keenly aware of
the gang problems facing the communities). Clark also states that those in favor of the Ordinance will be
encouraged because of the Court's seeming willingness to accept a more specifically worded ordinance.
See id. at 146 ("This Court, in opting for the middle ground, in all likelihood has placed the value of
community safety above that of individuals and their personal freedom to move freely throughout their
community."). However, Clark says that it is not clear what the tradeoff will be between individual liberty
and community because the Court did not fully discuss the issue of whether loitering is a fundamental right.
See id. at 148.
282. See generally Batey, Supra note 24.
283. See id.
284. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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where the justices balanced many factors.285 In Slaton, the justices "invoke 'the
quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself,"' to express the
importance of obscenity laws, and thus, justify the toleration of some vagueness.286
"Core crimes," such as homicide and rape, are examples of statutes drafted with
substantial ambiguity, yet the courts tolerate such ambiguity because of the severity
of such crimes.287 Therefore, the courts must look to the severity of the crime, as
well as the significance of the legislative goal."8 In no way discrediting obscenity
laws, could it not be said that the murders committed by criminal street gangs are
just as severe as the crimes committed by the obscene, if not more?289 If the courts
are willing to accept vagueness in a statute that protects people who suffer no
physical injury, should they not also accept vagueness in a statute meant to save
the lives of many citizens? 9" I would venture to say that the people living on the
south side of Chicago would say yes.
2. Factor in Burdens on Community Residents
The Chicago Neighborhood Organizations suggest that the precision of an
ordinance's wording should depend upon the breadth of the burden placed upon
the liberties of residents of the community, by that ordinance.2 "' If the community
is internalizing the weight of the ordinance, then the level of scrutiny applied by
the Court should be reduced. 2 The Chicago Neighborhood Organizations suggest
that Papachristou 293 and Shuttlesworth 294 are examples of where precision in an
ordinance is necessary because the ordinance is focused upon politically
285. See Batey, Supra note 24, at 10-11 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58 (1973)).
286. See id. at 11 (discussing Slaton, 413 U.S. 49).
287. See id. at 12.
288. See generally id. Batey believes the Court "implicitly undervalued the state's necessity argument
[in Kolender] and the California statute on which the argument was based." See id. at 14.
289. Cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (quoting Alexander Bickel, On
Pornography: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 22 PUB. INTEREST 25, 26 (1971) (stating that to
grant a person the right to be obscene in public would be to grant that person a right "to affect the world
about the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies")).
290. See id.
291. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 4, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121).
292. BriefAmicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 5, City of Chicago v. Morales,
119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-112 1). See also Meares and Kahan, supra note 32, at 209 (stating that the
court should ask whether the community has taken on part of the burden that particular policing laws have
on individual liberties, and if so, the court should assume those laws are not a violation on individual rights).
293. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
294. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
disadvantages minorities.295 However, the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations
assert that that is not the situation today, and that the Court should be more
flexible in its vagueness analysis.2"
VI. CONCLUSION
Few people can truly grasp the lifestyle residents of gang-dominated
neighborhoods in Chicago must endure.29 7 Even though the Justices in City of
Chicago v. Morales recognize the problems created by criminal street gangs, the
Justices read the Chicago Gang Congregation Ordinance with particularity, and
denied the Ordinance's constitutionality.298 Although personal liberty should be
protected for everyone, it seems inherently unfair for people to live in fear,
constantly looking out their windows and over their shoulders.299 In its discussion
of whether the use of a public nuisance injunction against criminal street gangs is
constitutional, the court in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna3° concluded:
To hold that the liberty of the peaceful, industrious residents of
Rocksprings must be forfeited to preserve the illusion of freedom for
those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a whole is to
ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the whole of its
sense.
301
Yet, there are some who believe that gang member or not, everyone should be
entitled to all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.3 2
After Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, it seems possible that the
Ordinance can be modified so as to remove the vagueness and withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 3 However, when all is said and done, the original
295. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations at 6, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)(No. 97-1121).
296. See id. at 10-11.
297. See Opinion Ruling Need Not Signal End of Anti-Gang Efforts, ATLANTA J., June 14, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 3778106; see also Walston, supra note 249, at 74 (stating that criminal street gangs
are an unreasonable interference with public rights). However, there is one misguided individual who firmly
defends street gangs, going so far to state that gangs are the equivalent of college fraternities and the Boy
Scouts. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance
Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409,431-32 (1999) (stating that
anti-gang injunctions are a flawed and ineffective measure against crime).
298. But see Betty Loren, Ridding Cicero of Gangs, CHi. TRIB., May 4, 1999, at 14 ("It seems as if
whenever certain municipalities or governmental leaders try to do some good for their constituents, they
automatically come under fire."). See generally City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
299. See Gerard Aziakou, Latinos in Chicago Suburb Outraged by Anti-Gang Ordinance, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, April 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2593738 (quoting Cicero town president, Betty
Loren, who stated that '[I]f [the ordinance] is unconstitutional, then somebody ought to look at the
Constitution,"' when discussing the restraining of liberties).
300. 929 P.2d 596 (1997).
301. See ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) (claiming to be reaffirming the
fundamental values of order and liberty expressed by Tocqueville).
302. See generally Werdegar, supra note 297 (expressing his disapproval of the anti-gang injunctions).
303. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (1999).
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question is once again asked; is it ok to restrain personal liberty to protect the
greater community? Unfortunately, there is no concrete answer and it is not likely
that a consensus will ever be reached.
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